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PELAKSANAAN RTL UNTUK ALGORITMA CINCANGAN SELAMAT KE 
ARAH SAIZ YANG LEBIH KECIL 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Pemindahan data dengan selamat merupakan tugas yang paling mencabar bagi Objek 
Rangkaian Internet (IoT). Keutuhan data perlu dipastikan sebelum dan selepas 
penghantaran data. Fungsi cincangan kriptografi secara amnya digunakan untuk 
pengesahan integriti data. Fungsi cincangan kriptografi adalah asas kepada rangkaian 
internet dan menjalankan proses seperti pengesahan identiti, pemeriksaan integriti fail, 
penghantaran kod, dan kawalan versi kod sumber. Antara semua cincangan kriptografi, 
Algoritma Cincangan Selamat (SHA-3) adalah cincangan kriptografi terbaru dan selamat 
untuk digunakan dalam bidang elektronik. Saiz Intel Microelectronic SHA-3 besar 
disebabkan banyak logika pertengahan algoritma. Objektif projek ini adalah untuk 
mereka bentuk SHA-3 dengan 256-bit keluaran dan 1600-bit matriks dengan saiz yang 
lebih kecil berbanding dengan seni bina Intel Microelectronic SHA-3. Penyelidikan ini 
melaksanakan SHA-3 dengan mengabungkan semua algoritma SHA-3 secara logik dan 
hanya menggunakan input lorong matriks bagi menghapuskan logika pertengahan untuk 
mengurangkan saiz reka bentuk. Kes ujian daripada Institut Piawaian dan Teknologi 
Kebangsaan (NIST) digunakan untuk pengesahan fungsi. Reka bentuk akhir SHA-3 
dalam kajian ini boleh mencapai pengurangan saiz sebanyak 12.57%, pengurangan 
bilangan get sebanyak 24.35%, pengurangan kritikal panjang sebanyak 18.84%, dan 
pengurangan kitaran jam yang diperlukan untuk menjana keluaran cincangan sebanyak 
75%. Kesimpulannya, SHA-3 yang lebih kecil dan prestasi yang lebih tinggi telah 
direkabentuk dan berkemungkinan boleh digunakan untuk memenuhi keperluan IoT. 
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RTL IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURE HASH ALGORITHM 3 (SHA-3) 
TOWARDS SMALLER AREA 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Secure data transfer has been the most challenging task for Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices. Data integrity must be ensured before and after the data transmission. 
Cryptographic hash functions are generally the basis of a secure network and used for 
data integrity verification. Cryptographic hash functions carried out processes such as 
identity verification, file integrity checking, secure key passing, and source code version 
control. Among all of the cryptography measures, Secure Hash Algorithm 3 (SHA-3) is 
the newest and secure cryptographic hash algorithm in the current electronic industry. In 
the previous Intel Microelectronic SHA-3 design, the synthesized area of the design is 
large due to many intermediate states and logics of the step mapping functions. The 
objective of this project is to design a synthesizable SHA-3 with 256-bits hash output and 
1600-bits state array with lower area compared to Intel Microelectronic SHA-3. This 
research implements the SHA-3 in ways such that all the step mapping algorithms are 
logically combined to only use the input lanes of the state array to eliminate the 
intermediate logics and reduces the area size. Functionality verification is done using the 
test case provided by National Institute Standards and Technology (NIST). Two 
squeezing phases are tested to ensure the functionality of design. Final design of SHA-3 
in this research can achieve area reduction by 12.57%, the cell count reduction by 24.35%, 
the critical path length reduction by 18.84%, and reduction of the clock cycles needed to 
generate the hash output by 75%. In conclusion, the SHA-3 with smaller area and higher 
performance has been designed and is possible to cater the needs of  IoT application.
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CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Secure data transfer has been the most challenging task for Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices. Important data must be encrypted before ready to transfer. Although data is 
encrypted for security, the encrypted data may still be altered on the network. 
Cryptographic hash functions are generally the basis of a secure network and mainly used 
for data integrity verification [1]. Cryptographic hash functions carried out processes such 
as identity verification, file integrity checking, secure key passing, and source code 
version control [2]. These cryptographic hash functions are widely used as sole 
cryptographic modules or incorporated in hash-based authentication mechanisms like the 
Hashed Message Authentication Code [3]. Additionally, applications that employs hash 
functions include the Secure Electronic Transaction [4], Internet Security Protocol [5] 
that is  a mandatory feature of the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) and the Public Key 
Infrastructure [6].  
 
There are several Hash functions such as SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512, MD4 and 
MD5. The most-widely used hash function recently was the Secure Hash Algorithm 2 
(SHA-2) and Message Digest 5 (MD5) [7, 8]. Recent advances in the cryptanalysis of 
these commonly used standard hash functions reported some collisions and serious 
vulnerabilities in these algorithms [9-11]. Although no assaults have yet been accounted 
for on the SHA-2 variations, but because of hardware likenesses to SHA-1 there are fears 
  
2 
 
that SHA-2 could likewise be broken sooner rather than later. SHA-3 is introduced as a 
more secure hash function in a competition organized by NIST [12]. Among all of the 
cryptography measures, Secure Hash Algorithm 3 (SHA-3) is the newest and secure 
cryptographic hash algorithm and had not been used in practice.  
 
 SHA-3 is an efficient scheme for both hardware and software implementation. 
Although SHA-3 can be implemented at software level, it is slower and less efficient 
compared to hardware implementation where parallel operation is possible [13]. For some 
Internet of Things (IoT) devices, cryptographic hash functions hardware is needed to 
provide data integrity verification in real time. Due to the demanded high security level, 
the need for high performance is a significant factor for the choice of security 
implementation. Thus, for securities issue, hardware implementation is far more suitable 
compared to the corresponding software implementations. Whereas the hardware 
implementations of cryptographic hash functions should be low in gate counts to cater 
the needs of smaller chips in IoT devices. The objective of this project is to design a 
hardware efficient SHA-3 with lower area compared to previous architecture. The final 
outcome of this project is a SHA-3 architecture design with small synthesized area. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Implementation of cryptographic hash function in IoT devices has to be secured 
to give extraordinary properties, for example, collision and preimage resistance, which 
are critical for some applications in data security [14]. Although data is encrypted for 
security, the encrypted data may still be altered on the network. The modified data can be 
disastrous for the applications executed at the destination node and can prompt off 
  
3 
 
undesired responses. Thus, hash function in hardware devices is needed for a more secure 
of data transmission. However, the commonly used standard hash functions such as SHA-
1 and MD5 had been reported for some collisions and serious vulnerabilities [9-11]. To 
prevent the possibility of SHA-2 to be cracked in the near future due to hardware 
similarity, SHA-3 is introduced to provide a more secure hash function capability. It was 
introduced in a competition organized by NIST [14]. Thus, it is importance to move the 
current security hash function from SHA-2 to SHA-3 in the industry application. 
 
The implementation of hash function hardware has to be area efficient since 
majority of Internet of Things (IoT) devices are embedded system where power and area 
is limited. As an emerging technology, promising solutions to transform the operation 
and role of many existing industrial system can be offered by IoT devices [15]. Since 
cryptographic hash function is applicable to most of the device in communication and the 
developed design will be reused for different hardware implementation, the hash function 
hardware has to be as smallest as possible. This will result in cost saving as well as smaller 
IoT devices. However, from the previous architecture, the area of the hardware 
implementations are large due to the implementation of Secure Hash Algorithm 3 without 
utilizing the resource correctly [16, 17].  By using hardware efficiently, such as reusing 
resources, or by analysing the algorithm of cryptographic hash function and reducing the 
unnecessary logic in the function, less hardware will be used and results in smaller area. 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
The objectives of this project are: 
1. To reduce the area of Secure Hash Algorithm-3 (SHA-3) in the previous 
implemented hardware design by logically combined the step mapping algorithms. 
2. To compare the performance of the proposed architecture and the previous 
implemented design in term of area, cell counts, critical path length, and speed. 
 
1.4 Scope of the Research 
The focus of this project is to determine the method to develop the Secure Hash 
Algorithm 3 (SHA-3) cryptographic hash function over the hardware approach by 
Register-Transfer Level (RTL) implementation. The design architecture is to feed the 
usage purpose of Intel Microelectronic Sdn. Bhd. Based on the specification, the previous 
SHA-3 hardware design of Intel Microelectronic Sdn. Bhd. is implemented and 
synthesized. System Verilog will be used to develop the cryptographic hash algorithm. 
The hardware section that contributes to the most percentage of total area is determined 
and analysed for suitable method to reduce the area. Then, the proposed design is 
developed to reduce the area of SHA-3 hardware implementation. Simulation will be 
performed on the test bench using Synopsys Verilog Compiler Simulator (VCS). After 
verified the functionality of the proposed design, the SHA-3 algorithm are then 
synthesised into logic gates and netlist using Design Compiler. This project will be 
focusing on area reduction by RTL implementation, the backend design is not covered. 
 
 The area report of the proposed design is then analysed for further improvement. 
The primary focus of this project is to reduce the area used in synthesis of the previous 
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SHA-3 hardware design. The specification of the SHA-3 are 256-bit hash output with 
1600-bits state of SHA-3 consists of 5x5 state matrix of 64-bit words. 
 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter two will summarize the research information which is based on the 
previous work of cryptographic hash function. It explains different types of methods used 
in develop the cryptographic hash function over the hardware implementation. The details 
of Secure Hash Algorithm 3, its previous hardware implementation and their performance 
analysis especially on area size will be explained here. 
 
Chapter three will be on the discussion of the method to be applied to implement 
the SHA-3 cryptographic hash function over the hardware approach. The flow charts, 
block diagrams and operational methods will be explained in this chapter. Method to 
further reduce the area of the previous architecture design will also be discussed in this 
chapter.  
 
Chapter four focuses on the simulation and performance analysis of the results of 
the implementation approach. The discussion will be made based on the area efficiency 
performance of the system. 
 
Chapter five concludes the project starting from the planning stage until the stage 
of implementation. The limitations found in this project will also be concluded in this 
chapter. Future works which might help in enhancing this project will be suggested here. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is about the study of cryptographic hash function and the research 
done previously about the hardware implementation methods of the selected 
cryptographic hash function (i.e., Secure Hash Algorithm 3). The SHA-3 cryptographic 
hash function comprises of five step mapping functions. The five step mapping functions 
comprise a round of KECCAK-p [b, nr] process. These five step mappings are denoted 
by θ, ρ, π, χ, and ι. These five different step mappings sections will be discussed here. 
The previous implemented hardware architecture of SHA-3 cryptographic hash function 
will also be discussed here. Since smaller area is needed to cater the needs in smaller IoT 
devices, the performance of area in the previous architecture will be explored. 
 
2.2 Cryptographic Hash Function 
A Hash function is a function that takes any amount of input and produces an 
output of fixed size [18]. Hash functions mainly used for data integrity verification. Hash 
functions can be utilized to build the security of a system network. When hash function 
is used correctly, they can be utilized to confirm the trustworthiness of the network packet 
source. Since a message that has been randomized by hash function is unique and cannot 
be converted back to the original message, it can be used to verify that the message has 
not been altered if the hash output of the message at the transmitter and the receiver side 
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are same [19]. Several types of hash functions are currently in used in the industry today, 
such as SHA-2 and MD5 [7, 8]. By analyse the usefulness and the security accessible in 
each function, the user can figure out which algorithm is most appropriate for their 
application. 
 
The most crucial part of any secure system is the data integrity. Cryptographic 
hash function can detect unauthorized changes in files by using the generated message 
digests. This is imperative in shielding the essentially sensitive databases [18]. Hash 
functions are different from other encryption cryptographic method such as Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) [20]. The generated message digest using hash cryptographic 
function is non-reversible, whereas the output message (i.e., encrypted and decrypted 
message) generated using AES is reversible. Hash functions are implemented due to their 
uniqueness and they cannot be reverted [21]. Hash functions can be combined with 
encryption to produce special message digests (i.e., Message Authentication Codes) that 
identify the source of the data. The standard algorithm used today is called Hashed 
Message Authentication Code [3] which gives confirmation of the data source, and 
furthermore anticipates against security assaults. HMAC uses a secret in the process to 
generate the hash, thus nobody is able to foresee the exact digest without the secret value 
and furthermore the hashed data content cannot be resolved from the hash digest. 
 
The input for hash function is known as the message, whereas the output is known 
as the digest value. The message length can be varied whereas the digest length is fixed 
based on the desired digest length. A message digest can be illustrated as the “fingerprint” 
of the data. For example, there will be no more than one data with the same fingerprint. 
No same output can be derived from multiple set of different input. A cryptographic hash 
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function is intended to give extraordinary properties, such as collision and preimage 
resistance, that are imperative for most of the applications data security [14]. For instance, 
during a fund transfer transaction, if there is a hacker intended to alter irregular bits of 
information, this may prompt to wrong finance being exchanged, or perhaps exchange to 
a wrong account. Under this situation, the hash function can provide the collision 
resistance which assures that the original message could not have been modified to an 
alternate message with a similar digest value, or a similar signature. This is a one-way 
deterministic procedure, which makes the hash function a one-way procedure [13]. 
 
One of the most important applications of hash functions is to the construction of 
MACs (Message Authentication Codes). MACs are cryptographic schemes designed to 
prevent an adversary from impersonating a legitimate user and from modifying a message 
without the legitimate users noticing it. The hash value of the data is figured and then 
affixed to the data. During the message retrieval at the destination, the hash value is 
refigured from the retrieved data. The refigured hash value is compared to the hash value 
that was appended to the original data. In the event that both the hash values do not match, 
it implies that the data has been changed. Figure 2.1 shows the generation and comparison 
of HMAC utilizing a shared secret K [13]. The secret K is utilized in the hash generation 
process of HMAC so that without knowing the exact secret K, nobody can foresee the 
exact digest value of the data. The H block in Figure 2.1 is simply the message attached 
with the secret K. The figure shows the hash output generated in the transmitter side is 
compared to the hash output generated in the receiver side. 
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Figure 2.1 Generation and comparison of hash value (HMAC) [13] 
 
Hash functions which are normally used in industry are SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-
512, MD4 and MD5. Recent advances in the cryptanalysis of commonly used standard 
hash functions reported some collisions and serious vulnerabilities in these algorithms [9-
11]. Although no assaults have yet been accounted for on the SHA-2 variations, but 
because of hardware likenesses to SHA-1 there are fears that SHA-2 could likewise be 
broken sooner rather than later [22]. To counter the possibility of SHA-2 to be cracked in 
future, SHA-3 is introduced as a more secure hash function in a competition organized 
by NIST [14]. 
 
2.3 Secure Hash Algorithm 3 
This section will explain the details of Secure Hash Algorithm 3. The current 
Secure Hash Algorithm used in industry is SHA-1 and the SHA-2 family of hash 
functions specified in Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 180-4 [23]. Secure 
Hash Algorithm 3 (SHA-3) is a newly formed function that will replace the SHA-1 and 
SHA-2 family in future. SHA-3 is based on KECCAK [24], which is the algorithm that 
NIST selected as the winner of the public SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm 
Competition.  
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The SHA-3 is a hash function, where the input is a binary data or string and the 
output is a fixed length binary data or string. The SHA-3 input is known as the message, 
whereas the output is known as the hash or digest value. The SHA-3 family consists of 
four cryptographic hash functions, called SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-
512, and two extendable-output functions (XOFs), called SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 
[12, 14]. The addition after the dash shows the fixed digest length (e.g., SHA3-512 yields 
a 512-bit digest). Since SHA-3 provides a similar arrangement of digest lengths with 
SHA-2, the SHA-3 can be actualized as other options to the SHA-2.  
 
The extendable-output functions XOFs (i.e., SHAKE128 and SHAKE256) are 
different from hash functions but, as stated in SHA-3 Standard, XOFs are conceivable to 
be utilized in the same ways, with the adaptability to be adjusted specifically to the 
prerequisites of individual applications, subject to extra security contemplations. The 
output of XOFs is adjustable to the desired output length. The suffixes “128” and “256” 
of the function names indicate the supported security strength [12, 14]. For the hash 
function to be cryptographically useful it is then a basic requirement that the function be 
collision resistant, in the sense that it should be infeasible for an adversary to generate a 
collision (i.e., two different messages with the same hash), since hashes have a short fixed 
length, there will be many messages which have the same hash value, so the hash function 
is far from being injective but it should look like that to an adversary.  
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2.3.1 KECCAK-p Permutations 
All of the SHA-3 functions utilize the same basic permutation and are methods or 
modes of operation of the permutation. The permutation is stated in the Federal 
Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB 202) as a newly formed family 
of permutations, the given permutation name is known as KECCAK-p [12]. The purpose 
of this specification is to give the adaptability to alter the security and size parameters in 
the advancement of any extra operation modes in future documents. 
 
There are two parameters in KECCAK-p permutations, which are the number of 
iterations of step mapping functions, known as a round and the fixed length of strings that 
undergo permutation, known as the permutation width. The number of rounds is indicated 
by 𝑛𝑟, whereas the width is indicated by b. The b range is in (25, 50, 100, 200, 400, 800, 
1600) and the 𝑛𝑟 is any positive integer. For instance, a KECCAK-p permutation which 
undergoes 𝑛𝑟 rounds of step mapping iteration with permutation width b is indicated by 
KECCAK-p[b, 𝑛𝑟 ]. One round of KECCAK-p permutation, which indicated by Rnd, 
comprises of a group of five transformations known as step mapping functions. An array 
of values for b bits, known as the state, is repeatedly updated in the permutation. The 
input data of the permutation is used to initialize the initial value of the state array[12].  
 
2.3.2 State 
The KECCAK-p[b, 𝑛𝑟] permutation consists of b bits, 𝑤 and 𝑙, where 𝑤 is b/25 
and 𝑙 is 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(
𝑏
25
). The relationship between these variables are given in the Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 KECCAK-p permutation variables’ relationship [12] 
b 25 50 100 200 400 800 1600 
w 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 
l 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 The state array of KECCAK-p[b, 𝑛𝑟] can be represented by A[x, y, z], a 5-by-5-
by- 𝑤 state matrix, where 0 ≤ 𝑥 < 5, 0 ≤ 𝑦 < 5, and 0 ≤ 𝑧 < 𝑤. The detailed elements 
in a state matrix are shown in Figure 2.2, whereas the labeling convention of the 
coordination for the state matrix is shown in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.2 The detailed elements in a state matrix [12]  
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Figure 2.3 The x, y, and z coordination for the elements in a state matrix [12] 
 
2.3.3 KECCAK-p[b, 𝒏𝒓](S) 
The final output from KECCAK-p[b, 𝑛𝑟](S) permutation given an input string S 
and b bits, consists of 𝑛𝑟 iterations of Round Function Rnd, as shown in the following 
steps. For example, a string S with 1600-bits, from the Table 2.1, l will be 6. Thus, 𝑛𝑟 
will be equal to 24. The string S will first be converted to state array A. Then the state 
array A will undergo 24 times of Round Function. After that, the state array A′ will be 
converted back to string S’ with length b. 
Algorithm to calculate KECCAK-p[b, 𝒏𝒓](S): 
1. Convert S into a state array, A 
2. For 𝑖𝑟 from 12 + 2l - 𝑛𝑟 to 12 + 2l – 1, let A′ = 𝑅𝑛𝑑(𝐴, 𝑖𝑟) 
3. Convert A′ into a string S’ of length b 
4. Return S’  
  
14 
 
2.3.4 Round function 
A complete Round Function, Rnd consists of five step mapping function, which 
are Theta (θ), Rho (ρ), Pi (π), Chi (χ), and Iota (ι). The Round Function given a state 
matrix A and a round index 𝑖𝑟  is shown in the Equation 2.1. The details of five step 
mapping function will be explained in the next section. 
𝑅𝑛𝑑(𝐴, 𝑖𝑟) = ι(χ (π (ρ (θ(A)))) , 𝑖𝑟)       ( 2.1 ) 
 
2.3.5 Step Mappings 
In this section, the five step mapping functions that result in one round of 
KECCAK-p[b, 𝑛𝑟], which are Theta θ, Rho ρ, Pi π, Chi χ, and Iota ι, will be explained 
here based on the SHA-3 specification [12]. Each step mapping function consists of the 
algorithm where the input is the state matrix A, whereas the output is the updated state 
matrix A’. The b parameter specifies the size of the state matrix. The operation algorithms 
of θ, χ and ι consisted of XOR operations with the bits in the state, whereas the operation 
algorithms of ρ and π consisted of rearrangement of bit position by rotation of the bits in 
x, y or z coordinates of the lane. 
 
Specification of θ(A) 
The effect of θ is to perform XOR operation in each bit of the state matrix with 
the parities of two columns in the state matrix as shown in Figure 2.4. In the illustration 
in Figure 2.4, the parity or the XOR operation of all the bits in the specified column is 
indicated by the summation symbol, ∑. For a single bit A[x, y, z], the x-coordinate of the 
first column is (x+1) mod 5, and the z-coordinate is z, whereas the x-coordinate of the 
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second columns is (x-1) mod 5, and the z-coordinate is (z-1) mod w. The algorithm for θ 
is shown in the Equations 2.2 – 2.4. 
 
Figure 2.4 Implementation of θ on a single bit [12] 
 
Algorithm to calculate Theta, θ(A): 
Input: State Matrix 𝑨 
Output: State Matrix 𝑨′ 
1. For 0≤x<5 and 0≤z<w, let 
𝐶[𝑥, 𝑧]  =  𝑨[𝑥, 0, 𝑧]  ⊕  𝑨[𝑥, 1, 𝑧]  ⊕  𝑨[𝑥, 2, 𝑧]  ⊕  𝑨[𝑥, 3, 𝑧]  ⊕  𝑨[𝑥, 4, 𝑧]  ( 2.2 ) 
2. For 0≤x<5 and 0≤z<w let 
𝐷[𝑥, 𝑧]  =  𝐶[(𝑥1) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 5, 𝑧]  ⊕  𝐶[(𝑥 + 1) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 5, (𝑧 – 1) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑤]   ( 2.3 ) 
3. For 0≤x<5, 0≤y<5, and 0≤z<w, let 
𝑨′[𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧]  =  𝑨[𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧]  ⊕  𝐷[𝑥, 𝑧]        ( 2.4 ) 
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Specification of ρ(A) 
The effect of ρ is to perform rotation of bits in each lane by an offset, depending 
on the x and y lane coordination. The z-coordinate of each bit in the lane is moved by a 
calculated offset. Modulus is used to prevent z-coordinate that larger than the lane size. 
The algorithm is shown in the Equations 2.5 – 2.6. 
Algorithm to calculate Rho, ρ(A): 
Input: State Matrix 𝑨 
Output: State Matrix 𝑨′ 
1. For 0≤z<w, let A′ [0, 0, z] = A[0, 0, z] 
2. Let x = 1 and y = 0 
3. For t from 0 to 23, for 0≤z<w, let 
𝑨′[𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧]  =  𝑨[𝑥, 𝑦, (𝑧– (𝑡 + 1)(𝑡 + 2)/2) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑤]     ( 2.5 ) 
(𝑥, 𝑦)  =  (𝑦, (2𝑥 + 3𝑦)𝑚𝑜𝑑 5)        ( 2.6 ) 
4. Output A′ 
 
Figure 2.5 shows the implementation of ρ when w = 8 and b = 200. The x and y 
coordination labelling is stated in Figure 2.2 and 2.3. The black dot shows the bit with 0 
z-coordination, whereas the grey cube shows the final position of the corresponding bit 
after shifted by the calculated offset from the ρ algorithm. All the other bits of the lane 
will be shifted circularly by the similar offset. If the final z-coordinate is larger than the 
lane size, the offset is reduced by modulus the lane size. For example, the offset for the 
lane A[3, 2], which located at the top left corner, has an offset of 1 bit (i.e., 153 mod 8 = 
1), therefore in this case, the last bit (i.e., z coordinate of 7) is shifted to the front bit (i.e., 
z coordinate of 0). 
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Figure 2.5 Implementation of ρ for the case b=200 and w=8 [12] 
 
Specification of π(A) 
The implementation of π is to remap the lane positions as shown in Figure 2.6. 
The x and y coordination labelling is stated in Figure 2.2 and 2.3. For example, the center 
of the slice is corresponding to the bit with coordinates A[0, 0]. The algorithm is shown 
in the Equation 2.7.  
Algorithm to calculate Pi, π(A): 
Input: State Matrix 𝑨 
Output: State Matrix 𝑨′ 
1. For 0≤x<5, 0≤y<5, and 0≤z<w, let 
𝐴′[𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧] = 𝐴[(𝑥 +  3𝑦) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 5, 𝑥, 𝑧]        ( 2.7 ) 
2. Output A′ 
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Figure 2.6 Implementation of π on a slice [12] 
 
Specification of χ (A) 
The implementation of χ is to perform XOR operation on each bit with two other 
bits in the same row by using non-linear function as shown in Figure 2.7. The algorithm 
is shown in the Equation 2.8. The dot in the Equation 2.8 is a multiplication, which is also 
similar to the Boolean “AND” operation in this case. 
Algorithm to calculate Chi, χ (A): 
Input: State Matrix 𝑨 
Output: State Matrix 𝑨′ 
1. For 0≤x<5, 0≤y<5, and 0≤z<w, let 
𝐀′[𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧]  =  𝐀[𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧]  ⊕  ((𝐀[(𝑥 + 1) mod 5, 𝑦, 𝑧]  ⊕  1)  ⋅  𝐀[(𝑥 + 2) mod 5, 𝑦, 𝑧]) 
           ( 2.8 ) 
2. Output A′ 
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Figure 2.7 Implementation of χ on a row [12] 
 
Specification of ι(A, 𝒊𝒓) 
The implementation of ι is to alter part of the bits in Lane (0, 0) depending on the 
round index 𝑖𝑟. Any other 24 lanes will not be affected by ι. The round index values are 
specified in the second step of the KECCAK-p[b, 𝑛𝑟 ](S) in section 2.3.3. There is a 
parameter in specification of ι called round constant RC, which is dependent on the 
algorithm rc(t). The algorithm for rc(t) is shown in the Equations 2.9 – 2.14. 
Algorithm to calculate Round Constant, rc(t): 
Input: Integer 𝒕 
Output: Round Constant rc(t) 
1. If t mod 255 = 0, return 1 
2. Let C = 10000000 
3. For i from 1 to t mod 255, let 
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𝐶 = 0||𝐶           ( 2.9 ) 
𝐶[0] = 𝐶[0] ⊕ 𝐶[8]                                           ( 2.10 ) 
𝐶[4] = 𝐶[4] ⊕ 𝐶[8]                                  ( 2.11 ) 
𝐶[5] = 𝐶[5] ⊕ 𝐶[8]                              ( 2.12 ) 
𝐶[6] = 𝐶[6] ⊕ 𝐶[8]                              ( 2.13 ) 
𝐶 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐8[𝐶]                   ( 2.14 ) 
4. Output 𝐶[0] 
 
The algorithm for the specification ι takes in the input state A and the round index 
𝑖𝑟. The round constant RC is generated from the rc(t) function above. The steps for the 
specification ι is shown in the Equations 2.15 – 2.16. 
Algorithm to calculate Iota, ι(A, 𝒊𝒓): 
Input: State Matrix 𝑨, Round Constant rc(t), Round Index 𝑖𝑟 
Output: State Matrix 𝑨′ 
1. For 0≤x<5, 0≤y<5, and 0≤z<w, let A′ [x, y, z] = A[x, y, z] 
2. Let RC = 0𝑤 
3. For 0≤j < l, let 
𝑅𝐶[2𝑗 − 1]  =  𝑟𝑐(𝑗 +  7𝑖𝑟)                   ( 2.15 ) 
4. For 0≤z<w, let  
𝐀′ [0, 0, 𝑧]  =  𝐀′ [0, 0, 𝑧]  ⊕  𝑅𝐶 [z]                 ( 2.16 ) 
5. Output A′ 
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2.3.6 Sponge Construction  
The sponge construction is indicated by SPONGE[f, pad, r](N, d). Sponge 
construction is a framework for specification of KECCAK-p[b, 𝑛𝑟 ](S) [12]. Sponge 
function permits to simplify methods of use where dedicated constructions would be 
needed for fixed-output-length. Figure 2.8 shows the general sponge construction 
framework [25]. Given a function f, a rate r, a padding rule pad, and an input string N 
with d bits, the sponge construction will give a truncated output z. Function f is a function 
operates on fixed length b-bits state. Rate r is a positive whole number where r < b, 
whereas capacity c is a positive whole number where c = b – r. The padding rule pad is 
used to produce padding (i.e., a bit string with a suitable length to attach to another bit 
string). The padded input data are first “absorbed” into the state matrix of the function, 
then processed state matrix are then “squeezed” out and then truncated to become z output. 
The detailed explanation of sponge construction framework is discussed in [25]. 
 
Figure 2.8 The architecture for sponge construction [25] 
 
 For instance, the implementation of KECCAK Secure Hash Algorithm 3 in 
sponge construction with 1600-bits (i.e., b-bits) state array, 24 (i.e., 𝑛𝑟) iteration of round 
function, 256 (i.e., c) capacity, 1344 (i.e., r) rate, and S input string is specified in 
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Equation 2.17. The choices of capacity c can be chosen based on the number of b-bits. 
The padding rule used in sponge construction for KECCAK SHA-3 is pad10*1, where 
the algorithm is explained in the Equations 2.18 – 2.19. The asterisk in “pad10*1” shows 
that the bit “0” is either discarded or repeated to yield an output bit string with desired 
length that will be appended to the string S.  
KECCAK[256] = SPONGE[KECCAK-p[1600, 24](S), pad10*1, 1344]  ( 2.17 )  
Algorithm to produce padding pad10*1(x, y): 
Input: Positive integer for desired length y, positive integer for current length x 
Output: String D such that x + length(D) is the multiple of y 
1. 𝐿𝑒𝑡 𝑖 = (−𝑥 − 2) mod y      ( 2.18 ) 
2. Output 𝐷 = 1 || 0𝑖 || 1      ( 2.19 ) 
 
The operation flow of for the equation of KECCAK[c] start with appending the 
input S string to 1600-bits by using the padding rule pad10*1. The appended string is then 
“absorbed” into the state array A and undergo 24 iterations of round function as explained 
in section 2.7. After 24 iterations of round function, the output is then “squeezed” out and 
truncated as a digest output with desired length (e.g., 256-bits digest output). 
 
2.4 Hardware implementation of Secure Hash Algorithm 3 
Several previous works had been done on the hardware implementation of SHA-
3 algorithm [13, 16, 17, 26-28]. Their works can be summarized with the following 
procedure. SHA-3 belongs to a sponge function which consists of two main parameters, 
which are capacity c and bit rate r as explained in Section 2.3.6. The b bits is the sum of 
bit rate r and capacity c which determine the SHA-3 width used in the permutation. The 
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maximum value of b bits is 1600-bits. Depending on the required length for digest output, 
suitable c and r can be chosen [13, 27].  
 
Figure 2.9 State Matrix of Secure Hash Algorithm 3 [13] 
 
The SHA-3 process comprises of three main phases, which are initialization, 
absorbing and squeezing. Firstly, the state array of SHA-3 is initialized with all zeros. 
During the absorbing phase, XOR operation is performed between the message with r-
bits block and the current state array, then 24 iterations of the round functions (as 
explained in Section 2.3.5) are executed. Finally, the state array is truncated as a digest 
output with desired length in the squeezing phase. A total of 24 iterations of step mapping 
function of SHA-3 will be carried out. Each iteration of step mapping function comprises 
of 5 stages, which are Theta θ, Rho ρ, Pi π, Chi χ and Iota i. The general equations used 
for the step mapping function are shown in Equations 2.20 - 2.25 [13, 27]. The Equations 
2.20 – 2.25 are based on the lane of the state array, whereas the equations of SHA-3 in 
Section 2.3.5 are based on the bit of the state array. The initialization and squeezing phase 
are similar for the previous works. The main difference is on the hardware architecture 
implementation for the absorbing phase, which will led to different results in hardware 
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performance in term of throughput and area. Some of the hardware architecture of 
previous works will be discussed here. 
 
Theta (θ) Stage, for 0 ≤ x <5and 0 ≤ y <5: 
𝐶[𝑥] = 𝐴[𝑥, 0] ⊕ 𝐴[𝑥, 1] ⊕ 𝐴[𝑥, 2] ⊕ 𝐴[𝑥, 3] ⊕ 𝐴[𝑥, 4]               ( 2.20 ) 
𝐷[𝑥] = 𝐶[𝑥 − 1] ⊕ 𝑅𝑂𝑇(𝐶[𝑥 + 1], 1)                 ( 2.21 ) 
𝐴′[𝑥, 𝑦] = 𝐴[𝑥, 𝑦] ⊕ 𝐷[𝑥]                  ( 2.22 ) 
Where ROT is the cyclic shift function, A is the input state matrix, C and D are the 
intermediate state matrixes, and 𝐴′ is the output state matrix. 
 
Rho (ρ) and Pi (π) Stage, for 0 ≤ x <5and 0 ≤ y <5: 
𝐵[𝑦, 2𝑥 + 3𝑦] = 𝑅𝑂𝑇(𝐴[𝑥, 𝑦], 𝑟[𝑥, 𝑦])                 ( 2.23 ) 
Where ROT is the cyclic shift function, r [x, y] is the cyclic shift offset, A is the input 
state matrix, and 𝐵 is the output state matrix. 
 
Chi (χ) Stage, for 0 ≤ x <5and 0 ≤ y <5:                    
𝐴[𝑥, 𝑦] = 𝐵[𝑥, 𝑦] ⊕ ((𝑁𝑂𝑇 𝐵[𝑥 + 1, 𝑦])𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝐵[𝑥 + 2, 𝑦])              ( 2.24 ) 
Where 𝐵 is the input state matrix, and 𝐴 is the output state matrix. 
 
Iota (i) Stage:  
𝐴′[0,0] = 𝐴[0,0] ⊕ 𝑅𝐶                   ( 2.25 ) 
Where RC is the round constant, A is the input state matrix, and 𝐴′ is the output state 
matrix. 
 
